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There is considerable interest in predicting the efficiency of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
protocols when one of their implementation quantities is modified. One significant imperfection that
affects the efficiency of the setup is the afterpulse phenomenon which consists in the spontaneous
detections triggered by trapped carriers after previous avalanches at the detectors. While it is widely
studied in bibliography for various QKD protocols, it has been reported much more scarcely for
the well-known decoy-state QKD protocols and for dual detectors only. We develop a theoretical
analysis of afterpulsing effect on the decoy-state QKD protocols for multiple detectors, delivering
results which can be used as a guide for every practical decoy-state QKD protocol implementation in
real-world deployments. A new formula connecting the baseline system error rate and the afterpulse
probability is derived which may hold for all protocols as it is consisted of only setup-related quantities.
Numerical simulations addressing the significance of breaking down the quantities pertaining to
the decoy-state QKD protocols are being made, focusing on the weak+vacuum decoy-state QKD
protocol as a characteristic subcase.
I. INTRODUCTION
The decoy-state Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) pro-
tocol [1] is being widely used from fiber-optic communica-
tions (ex. SECOQC project) to satellite communications
[2]. In the field of practical QKD system deployments,
where highly attenuated laser sources are used to provide
the single photons on the Alice stations, the decoy-state
QKD implementation has been proven as one of the most
resistant protocols against the photon-number-splitting
(PNS) attack [3], which is linked with the non-zero prob-
ability of emitting multi-photon states. Even though the
use of superconducting single photon detectors (SSPDs)
has been proposed as an alternative path to achieve long
distance QKD with decoy states [4], these expensive detec-
tors based on complex and bulky cryogenic systems cannot
be a practical solution offering massive-scale adoption in
future QKD deployments. Whilst commercially available
SSPD units exhibit no afterpulsing and high detection
efficiencies combined with low dark count rates [5], most
practical and low-cost implementations will probably con-
tinue to make use of single-photon avalanche detectors
(SPADs).
Whilst the advances in SPAD technology allow for
high detection efficiencies and robust operation at even
lower prices [6], the afterpulse phenomenon or afterpulsing
limits the performance of its use. Afterpulsing is the prob-
abilistic phenomenon of triggering a new detection after
a previous detection has occured. Afterpulse events do
not differ from actual signal-induced events and thus they
cannot be distinguished from the latter ones [7]. Although
there are various models for describing the statistics of
afterpulsing [8, 9], they all conclude in capturing it via
one single quantity; the probability (pAP) of having an
afterpulse event conditioned on a previous detection event
as indicated in [10]. Those results are not correlated with
the kind of the protocol or the setup that will be used.
The contribution of afterpulsing to error counts has
been addressed, especially in demonstrations where QKD
systems operating at GHz detection rates [11]. Aside
from these high-speed QKD demonstrations, the need to
study the afterpulsing effects not only on the Secure Key
Rate (SKR) of each protocol but also on every underline
quantity is still important for maintaining a wider sense
of things; this approach will permit to obtain an overview
over the physical meaning behind every implementation
quantity of the QKD protocol. In this direction, signif-
icant work has been reported in other papers for other
protocols such as BB84 QKD but their method cannot
be used in decoy-state protocols, see [12, 13].
From the deployment perspective of decoy-state QKD
implementations, it is important to formulate the way
that the afterpulse phenomenon affects the efficiency of
the QKD protocols based on closed-form expressions. A
great work for the case of multiple protocols- applied also
to decoy-state protocols- is the work of Yuan et al. in
[14] where they have focused on a dual detector setup
at Bob’s side (the receiver). In our work, we aim to
generalize the Bob’s setup, as the model considered in our
paper does not set limitations for the setup’s number of
detectors. Nevertheless, our analysis is restricted only to
decoy-state protocols instead of multiple protocols as in
[14]. Aside from the compatibility of our proposed model
with different receiver layouts, we also focus on the effect
of afterpulsing to the baseline system error rate. More
specifically, we derive a mathematical expression between
the afterpulse probability and the baseline system error
rate, where tradeoff-like relation between the dark count
rate and the afterpulse probability for generating the
same Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) is revealed. The
mathematical form of this relation is important to know
as the QBER establishes an upper limit for quantum
error correction algorithms above which these algorithms
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2cannot be used.
Compared to the theoretical outcomes in [14], as proved
in [15] and also studied in [16], quiet (low noise), slow
detectors exhibit similar or better performance than dual
detectors at longer distances (longer than 100 km), while
noisy detectors have similar performance compared to
dual detectors. Hence, the case studied in our work
performs the same or better for longer distances than
dual detectors case because the latter suffers from lower
efficiency values at these distances. For shorter imple-
mentation layouts, we derive similar results with [14] as
demonstrated in the main text via simulations.
Through this research contribution, we incorporate the
afterpulse phenomenon into the equations presented in
[17] succeeding to maintain the same definition for each
quantity. These theoretical formulas open the door to-
wards the study of the effect of the afterpulse phenomenon
on the numerous deployed decoy-state QKD protocols.
However, we mainly focus on the case of two decoy states
and more specifically the weak+vacuum decoy-state where
our results match the results of Yuan et al. in [14], en-
hancing the credibility of both works.
II. THEORETICAL RESULTS
The basic equations for the decoy-state QKD protocols
were introduced by Ma and Lo in [17]. In this paper, we
adopt the model used in [17] and we build upon these
equations to provide the modified ones for a step-by-step
explanation of our way of thinking. For this purpose, the
reader who wants to fully understand the meaning of each
quantity presented below is encouraged to read the first
two sections of paper [17]. However, we will present the
two kind of equations, the previous ones and our modified
version, with this exact order in order for this paper to
be as self-sustaining as possible.
A. Model of source
For the receiver, we have considered the general case
where Bob uses m detectors for the signal reception. In
most cases, m equals to 2 [18] and less often equals to 4
[19]. The reason behind the selection of this general case
with m detectors lies in the fact that different individual
Single-Photon Avalanche Diode (SPAD) detectors- even
if identical in type, make, brand, etc.- behave practically
in a completely different way [10].
The multiple detector case is equivalent with the case
of one common afterpulse probability featuring the weight
of each detector:
pAP =
N∑
m=1
1
N
(1 + rm)pAP,m (1)
where pAP,m is the afterpulse probability of the m detector
and rm is the bias of the m detector meaning the percent
change from the ideal case where every detector has the
same probability to detect (rm = 0). These bias values
may emerge from the misalignment of the setup which
favours one or more detectors or from the Alice’s setup
which may create non-ideal qubits.
The definition implies that the following condition must
hold:
N∑
m=1
rm = 0
−1 ≤ rm ≤ N − 1
(2)
where the equalities on the latter formula for the detection
m signify the case that all distributing photons enter the
m detector (rm = N−1) and the case that no distributing
photon enters the m detector (rm = −1) respectively. The
first of Eqs. 2 implies that when the kth detector satisfies
the rk = N − 1, then every other detector is forced to
have rm6=k = −1.
B. Modified representation of the general model of
decoy-state QKD protocols
Through our framework building, we have preserved
the sources and the channel models used in [17]. Hence,
we present only the modified quantities connected with
the detectors which are the yield Yi and the Quantum
Bit Error Rate ei.
• Yield (Yi): the probability that Bob detects an
event conditioning an i-photon state was sent. Note
that Y0 is the noise contribution [17].
Considering that the main noise source is originated
from the dark counts of the detector, which is very
common practice, we obtain [20]:
Y0 = pDC
Yi ∼= Y0 + ηi (3)
where pDC is analogous to the number of detectors
used in our setup and ηi is the transmittance of
an i-photon state. It should be mentioned that the
photons in the same state have been considered
independent (ηi = 1− (1−η)i), while the η includes
the overall transmission and detection efficiency
[17].
From the definition of the afterpulse phenomenon,
we can assume that some of the detected back-
ground counts are originating from dark count
events. Hence, we can modify Eq. 3 as:
Y0 = (1 + pAP)pDC
Yi ∼= Y0 + ηi(1 + pAP) (4)
3where pAP is the already defined afterpulse proba-
bility and is provided from Eq. 1.
• Quantum Bit Error Rate (ei): The i-photon state
error rate is given by [17]:
ei =
e0Y0 + edetectorηi
Yi
(5)
where edetector is the baseline system error rate [20]
and it describes the probability of a photon to be
erroneous detected. Thus, e0 is the error rate of the
background which is assumed to be random [17].
Hence e0 =
1
2 .
When a pulse carrying single photons reaches the
Bob station which hosts the SPAD units, afterpuls-
ing may trigger one more detection event -whether
or not the previous pulse was detected correctly.
Furthermore, the detection triggered by afterpulsing
may count as correct or wrong with equal probabil-
ity. This probability is expressed by e0pAPηi. As a
result we obtain:
ei =
e0Y0 + (e
′
detector + e0pAP)ηi
Yi
(6)
In this case, the e′detector does not include the after-
pulse phenomenon as in Eq. 5; since we intend to
isolate the afterpulsing effect; we aim to a break-
down of the basic equations. Following this path,
e′detector can be used in our model as the quantity
describing the baseline system error rate without
considering the afterpulsing.
The modified formulas 4 and 6 describe the basic quan-
tities for every metric of the decoy system and they can
now be adopted to obtain the efficiency of the system via
the total QBER and the SKR values.
Hence, the total gain, meaning the probability of having
a detection, can be found:
Qµ = Y0 + (1− e−ηµ)(1 + pAP) (7)
where the term (1− e−ηµ) expresses the detection proba-
bility due to external photons coming from a signal state.
We are now in position to express the total QBER as:
Eµ =
1
Qµ
[e0Y0 + (e
′
detector + e0pAP)(1− e−ηµ)] (8)
The lower bound of the Secure Key Rate is given by
[17]:
R ≥ q{−f(Eµ)QµH2(Eµ) +Q1[1−H2(e1)]} (9)
where f(x) is the bi-direction error correction efficiency
as a function of the error rate and H2(x) is the binary
Shannon information function.
Equations 4 and 6-8 are the desired theoretical out-
comes after the break down of the basic decoy-state QKD
protocol. Their importance will be comprehensively dis-
cussed in the following sections.
We are able to replace our results into Eq. 9 to estimate
the lower bound of the SKR performance.
C. Baseline system error rate dependence on
afterpulsing
In this section, we will derive theoretical formulas for
estimating the protocol’s efficiency and for describing
the dependence of the baseline system error rate from
the afterpulse probability. We consider the typical case
where the background rate is low (Y0  η) and the
transmittance is small η  1 as was chosen in [17].
Using our equations addresing the presence of after-
pulse, the SKR can now be approximated:
R ∼=− ηµ(1 + pAP)f(edetector)H2(edetector)
+ ηµe−µ(1 + pAP)[1−H2(edetector)]
(10)
which is a better approximation than the one given in
[17] even though the difference is very small as usually
pAP  1.
In the process of acquiring Eq. 10, it was derived that
the following must hold:
edetector =
e′detector + e0pAP
1 + pAP
(11)
Hence, a mathematical expression describing the way
that afterpulsing affects the baseline system error rate
was found. For pAP = 0, Eq. 11 leads to the ideal case as
expected. Its correctness will be compared against results
of [14] in Subsec. III B through numerical simulations.
Although Eq. 11 was derived through the use of the decoy-
state QKD protocols model, there is no indication that it
should hold only for these protocols because it connects
quantities of the setup irrelevant to QKD protocols.
Furthermore, from Eq. 10, we can find that the optimal
µ fulfils:
(1− µ)exp(−µ) = f(edetector)H2(edetector)
1−H2(edetector) (12)
which is the same as in [17] but with edetector given now
by Eq. 11 so as expected the baseline system error rate,
4edetector, is very important as it affects the secure key
rate as shown in Eq. 10 not only directly but also indi-
rectly through quantity µ. As a result the change, due
to afterpulsing, of quantity edetector needs to be studied
separately.
At this point, we need to mention that if dark noise is
considered sufficiently low, the QBER performance can
be approximately calculated:
QBER ' 1− V
2
(13)
where V expresses the interference visibility value and
is a measure of the efficiency of Alice’s and Bob’s inter-
ferometers; representing the efficiency of separating the
input pulses.
By adopting the same logical assumptions mentioned
in the beginning of this subsection and using Eq. 13, we
can find that:
V ' 1− 2
[e′detector + e0pAP
1 + pAP
]
(14)
We confirm, as expected from the definition, that the
afterpulse phenomenon affects the interference visibility
and we managed to establish the connection between
these quantities.
III. DISCUSSION AND SIMULATIONS
A. Baseline system error rate sensitivity to
afterpulsing
As we aforementioned the baseline system error rate
(edetector) depends on the afterpulse probability according
to Eq. 11. We study on the change:
edetector change =
edetector − e′detector
e′detector
=
pAP
1 + pAP
(
e0
e′detector
− 1
) (15)
Although Eq. 1 implicates the use of more than one
detectors, we will adopt the ideal case for delivering our
simulations. The ideal case is where rm = 0 for every
detector and pAP,m is identical for each unit. This as-
sumption was considered since we are focusing on the
afterpulsing repercussions.
Typical values of quantities e0 and e
′
detector are 1/2
and less than 5% respectively [21–23]. As a result, the
afterpulse phenomenon affects significantly the baseline
system error rate. Moreover, its impact becomes stronger
for implementations setups featuring lower error detector
performance. For e′detector = 2%, the percent change
of the total baseline system error rate as a function of
afterpulsing is the following:
edetector change = 24
pAP
1 + pAP
(16)
where for a reasonable value of pAP [10, 24], pAP = 0.8%,
we obtain a percent change equal to 19%.
For the following simulations, we have considered simi-
lar values to [14] for the implementation parameters in
order to make direct comparisons. More specifically, we
have considered two identical detectors with total dark
count probability equal to 6 × 10−7. Bob’s detector ef-
ficiency is assumed to be 10% and we have also consid-
ered lossless Bob’s implementation setup. The optical
losses of the fibers involved into the simulations are 0.21
dB/km which is the typical attenuation parameter for the
standard telecom fibers at 1550 nm. Furthermore, the
efficiency of the error correction algorithm is 1.16.
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FIG. 1. Baseline system error rate related to afterpulse proba-
bility.
Figure 1 illustrates the baseline system error rate as a
function of pAP under different implementation parame-
ters. Although, as we have mentioned, values of e′detector
greater than 5% rarely hold in realistic deployments, we
have presented them for the completeness of our study
and to facilitate the discussion on some interesting per-
spectives of our theoretical study. When e′detector > e0,
afterpulsing seems to improve the baseline system error
rate; this can be easily explained as we have incorporated
a quantity (i.e. the afterpulsing) which leads to 50% error
rate in a quantity (e′detector) with greater error rate. It is
not the first time in bibliography where unexpected fea-
tures of the QKD protocols improve their efficiency [25].
Moreover, in the same figure there is a linear behaviour
of the baseline system error rate (edetector) for varying
afterpulsing within a range of afterpulse probability val-
ues (approximately less than 10%) and reaches the limit
50% for large values of the afterpulse probability. This
5linear behaviour can be easily derived from Eq. 11 by
taking into account that pAP  1. Although the relation
e′detector  e0pAP usually holds, it is important to pre-
serve the second term of the numerator because due to
this term edetector is strictly increasing with the afterpulse
probability, pAP, when e0 > e
′
detector, which is generally
true. If this term was ignored, the baseline system error
rate (edetector) would be also decreasing in this case losing
that way the physical meaning behind the afterpulsing
parameter, i.e. the afterpulse phenomenon increases the
baseline system error rate. Overall, it is reasonable that
an analogous dependence behaviour between visibility
and afterpulsing exists.
Our mathematical model permits to precisely describe
the protocols efficiency dependence on the afterpulsing
and thus to establish the way that the setup’s parameters
affect the QBER. Then a tradeoff-like relation between
the setup’s parameters is emerged; the ”tradeoff-like”
term is used because there is a tradeoff relation if and
only if the QBER has to remain the same when the
parameters change, this is something that rarely applies.
Figure 2 provides more details on the aforementioned
argument. It illustrates the relationship between the
setup quantities, i.e. the e′detector, the dark count rate
and the pAP, for different values of transmission loss
for which the QBER of the setup is equal to 9% (lower
than 9% in the area under the graphs). This QBER
threshold was chosen as it assesses the upper limit under
which the frequently used CASCADE error correction
algorithm works [12]. Comparing the results depicted
in the two subfigures of Fig. 2, it is evident that the
increase of the transmission loss reduces the maximum
possible dark count rate that can be used for maintaining
the desired QBER levels; thus there is a threshold for
the dark count rate depending on the transmission loss
above which whatever values the afterpulse probability
and the e′detector have, the desired QBER is not achieved.
Moreover, Fig. 2 divulges the tradeoff-like relation among
the quantities which form the total baseline system error
rate- i.e. the afterpulse probability, the dark count rate
and the e′detector- for maintaining the same QBER value.
More precisely, keeping constant the value of one of these
three quantities, the possible values of the other two
quantities are tracked. This has immediate practical
repercussion as one can accomplish the same QBER value
by reducing the baseline system error rate (ameliorating
the alignment of the setup) or the dark count rate, when
only low cost detectors are available or when the SSPDs
operate on high frequencies while the readout circuit
is at room temperature where non zero afterpulse-like
phenomenon is created [26].
B. Implementation of our results on the
Weak+Vacuum QKD protocol
We have chosen the weak+vacuum QKD protocol since
it is the most widely used implementation in the decoy-
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FIG. 2. Relationship between the setup quantities (e′detector,
dark count rate, pAP) for maintaining QBER = 9% (area
below graph corresponds to QBER < 9%). Transmission
loss is 10.5 dB and 21 dB for subfigure (a) and subfigure (b)
respectively.
state protocols category [27, 28]. This protocol uses two
decoy states where the first one is the vacuum state and
the second one is the weak decoy state which its intensity
is lower than the signal’s one.
For our simulations we adopt the following assumption
presented in [29] which can be used to every decoy-state
QKD protocol:
Yi(decoy) = Yi(signal)
ei(decoy) = ei(signal)
(17)
From this assumption, we find:
6Qν1 = Y0 + (1− e−ην1)(1 + pAP) (18)
where the symbol ν1 expresses the power of the weak decoy
signal and the term (1− e−ην1) expresses the detection
probability due to external photons associated with the
weak decoy state.
Then we have:
Eν1 =
1
Qν1
[e0Y0 + (edetector + e0pAP)(1− e−ην1)] (19)
We proceed then via simulations for visualizing the con-
nection of the efficiency of the protocol and the afterpulse
phenomenon.
In this section, the connection between the SKR and
the afterpulse probability for different transmission dis-
tances and values of baseline system error rate is aimed to
be pictured. As a result, maximizing the SKR of a QKD
setup demands the optimization of all other quantities
involved. Those quantities are the intensities of the signal
and decoy pulses. In [17], the optimized powers for the
decoy pulses are found; the optimized weak pulses demon-
strate an average photon number per pulse, ν, equals to
0.038, 0.05, 0.12 for 0, 5, 21 dB transmission loss respec-
tively whereas the average photon number per pulse of
the vacuum decoy pulses (q) is proved to be optimized
when the pulses are ideal vacuum, q = 0. The optimized
value of the average photon number for the signal state
(µ) depends on the afterpulse probability, on the baseline
system error rate and on the transmission distance, it
is different for every combination and it has been found
through simulations. Hence, each figure has the best pos-
sible combination of the power of each of the three states
of the weak+vacuum protocol for the given detector’s
quantities and the transmission distance in order to study
only the effect of the afterpulse probability.
Figure 3 represents our results. In Fig. 3(a) the same
baseline system error rate as in [14] was used; comparing
the cases of 0 dB and 5 dB transmission losses with the
corresponding figure in [14], an almost exact agreement
is visible enhancing both works credibility. These two
subfigures indicate as expected that the higher the base-
line system error rate without the afterpulse probability
(e′detector) is, the smaller the generated SKR is.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have broken down the various effects
of the afterpulsing on every quantity involved in decoy-
state QKD protocols with undefined number of different
detectors. An additional bias favouring one or more
detectors compromising the rest is considered, generalizing
Bob’s setup.
Through the process of extracting the aforementioned
theoretical formulas, the dependence between the base-
line system error rate and the afterpulse probability was
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FIG. 3. Secure Key Rate per pulse in relevance with the
afterpulse phenomenon in a logarithmic scale for different
base line error rate in each subfigure. Subfigure (a) is for
e′detector = 0.5% and subfigure (b) is for e
′
detector = 2%.
revealed as a necessity for compatibility between the equa-
tions presented in [17] and our modified ones. However,
we believe that this relation also holds outside the decoy-
state protocols as it describes a setup quantity and as
it only relies on other setup implementation quantities
and not on the protocol’s parameters; it is for future
experiments to ascertain this argument. Furthermore,
the value of the total baseline system error rate has a
major impact on the QBER of the system, revealing a
tradeoff-like relation among its components such as the
afterpulse probability and the dark count rate. Numer-
ical simulations studied -using realistic values for each
quantity- to trail this tradeoff-like relation where also a
7transmission loss dependent upper threshold for the dark
count rate is revealed, above which the desired QBER
cannot be accomplished. A similar dependence between
the visibility of the setup and the afterpulsing is also
proved to exist.
Therefore, we have demonstrated a way to study a` pri-
ori the effect of the afterpulse phenomenon on the setup’s
efficiency for the general case of N detectors making feasi-
ble the proper choice for balancing the detectors’ quality
and their cost. Applying our results to the weak+vacuum
decoy-state QKD protocol, the outcomes of our approach
were verified by comparing the SKR performance of previ-
ous related work under the same assumptions; enhancing
that way all of our outcomes, i.e. both the aforementioned
breakdown of the general decoy-state QKD model and the
derived mathematical expression for the baseline system
error rate and the afterpulsing.
We believe that the methodology presented in our re-
search, for the case of the afterpulse phenomenon, can be a
guidance for also incorporating other future imperfections
in a single unified formula.
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